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　　　Comparing　between　two　periods　during　which　the　Muslim－Copt　Conflicts　arose，1906－19
and　1972－81，　this　study　reexamines　the　rise　and　accommodation　of　the　conflicts　that　have
been　widely　regarded　to　be　ethno－religious．
　　　The　analysis　of　the・tensions，　cross－ethnic　and　intro－ethnic，　is　conducted　so　as　to　deline・
ate　the　transformation，　not　the　primordium，　of　group　identity　in　both　Mulsim　and　Coptic
communities．
　　　This　study　argues　that　the　change　in　group　identity　took　place　in　the　course　of　socio－
economic　changes．　During　each　period　of　concern，　socio－economic　transformations　challen－
ged　the　traditional　political　structure，　and　triggered　the　re－alignment　of　cooperation　and
conflict　within　as　well　as　between　the　Muslims　and　the　Copts．
　　　Although　the“emergence”of　con伍ct　between　the　Copts　and　the　Muslims　seems　to
indicate　the　symbolic　importance　of　religion，　the　actual　process　analyzed　in　this　study
illustrates　that　neither　community　is　monolithic．
　　　　It　was　not　nationalism／communalism　but　fundamentalism，　both　Islamic　and　Christian，
that　can　attract　the　people　whose　interests　were　infringed　under　the　new　nation－state　system．
，
1 Introduction
　　　For　Islamic　society，　known　as　a　plural　society　where　extremely　divergent　communltles
exist　in　tefms　of　race，　religion　and　language，　the　religious／ethnic　conflict　has　been　a　factor
impeding　the　society’s　national　integration　in　the　course　of　nation－building．　Focusing　on　this
religious／ethnic　conflict　in　Islamic　society，　this　study　will　investigate　the　confrontation　and
compromise　between　nationalism　and　communalism　in　a　plural　society，　whereby　analyzing
the　mechanism　of　national　integration．
　　　The　Islamic　sphere　as　a　whole，　when　it　is　referred　to，　is　often　expressed　in　a　metaphor，
“The　Islamic　World　is　a　mosaic　society．”As　this　metaphor　suggests，　the　Islamic　World　where
great　varieties　of　races，　languages　and　religions　are　intermingled　is　widely　understood　a－s．　an
aggregation　of　numerous　communities　on　various　levels，　such　as　tribes，　villages，　u’rban
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districts，　trade　associations，　sects　and　cults，　all　of　which　are　regarded　to　have　been　formed
mainly　according　to　religions　and　exist　as　isolated　and　self－sufficient　social　groups．（1）The
view　that　such　segmentalism　is　the　unique　characteristic　of　the　lslamic　World　is　dominant　not
only　in　analyses　of　the　pre－modern　Islamic　World，　as　represented　by　so－called“Mosaic
theory”，　but　is　also　prevailing　in　the　present　age，　with　even　greater　emphasis　and　without
modifications，　as　typically　seen　in　the　reportings　on　the　Lebanese　civil　war．　Yet，　when　looking
back　on　the　history　of　human　society　as　a　whole，　it　becomes　clear　that　plural　societies　in
general，　which　consist　of　nearly　a　chaotic　mixture　of　communities　formed　on　the　basis　of
race，　language　and　religion，　present　a　most　regular　pattern　of　society　which　human　beings
have　experienced　since　the　beginning　of　our　history．　The　Islamic　World　is　no　exception　to
such　a　pattern．　The　overemphasis　on　the　lslamic　World　as　specifically　constituting　a　mosaic
remains　unconfirmed　not　only　historically　but　also　in　the　present　global　environment．
Suppose，　for　instance，　that　a　world　map　is　to　be　painted　in　different　colors　according　to
ethnic，　linguistic　and　religious　identities，　then　the　map　may　turn　out　to　be　totally　a　mixture
of　colored　points，　just　Iike　a　drawing　of　pointillism．　Such　pointillistic　pattern，　once　described
by　Arnold　Toynbee　as“shot－silk　robe”，　can　be　observed　throughout　the　greater　part　of　the
world．②Even　in　West　European　nation－states　which　supplied　a　model　of　nationalism，　this
pattern　does　exist　though　to　a　lesser　degree．　In　short，　it　is　nothing　but　a　biased　view　to　name
the　Islamic　World　simply　a　mosaic　or　segmentalistic　society．
　　　　There　is　another　view　on　the　Islamic　World　that　is　also　conventional　and　has　been
serving　as　the　complement　of　the　above－mentioned　mosaic　theory．　This　view　proceeds　from
the　premise　that　Islam　is　not　merely　a　religion　but　also　possesses　in　itself　a“holistic”
principle　which　penetrates　into　and　governs　every　aspect　of　human　life　both　in　sacred　and
secular　worlds：ethics，　law，　politics，　economy，　military，　activity，　technology，　culture，　ideology，
etc．　In　other　words，　Islam　fulfils，　due　to　its　holistic　character，　the　integrating　functions　of
Islamic　society　where　fragmented　communities　of　the　mosaic　are　divided　vertically　according
to　religious　identities．　However，　to　take　Christianity　as　an　example，　one　can　easily　see　the
same　holistic　character　also　in　Calvin　Swiss　or　Puritanism　of　United　States．　These　under－
standings　of　the　Islamic　World，　mosaic　and　holistic，　are　after　all　under　bias　deriving　from　the
same　root，　what　Edward　Said　called“Orientalism”．
　　　　Most　conventional　studies　on　nationalism　and　communalism　of　this　region　have　tended，
on　the　basis　of　the　abovementioned　double－bias，　either　to　emphasize　the　integrity　of　the
Muslim　Arab　majority　or　to　insist　on　the　heterogeneity　of　the　non－Muslim　Arab　minority．　In
this　study，　however，　the　author　will　look　at　the　diversity　among．the　groups　in　the　Middle
Eastern　society　as　depending‘‘less　on　the　isolation　of　the　various　groups　than　on　the　relations
between　them．”（4）That　is　to　say，　this　study　will　・examine　the　dynamism　of　Islamic　society，
taking　the　relationships　among　different　groups　as　a　unit　of　analysis．　The　period　to　be　dealt
with　will　be　from　the　latter　half　of　the　nineteenth　century，　the　period　of　Imperialism　when　the
existence　of　non－Muslim　Arab　communities　became　serious　political　issue．
　　　　Imperialists，　who　in　various　ways　began　to　take　advantage　of　cultural　and　social
differences　among　the　groups　they　had　conquered，　stirred　up　hatred　among　these　groups
toward　social　disintegration　by　highlighting　heterogeneities　inside　the　society．　This　was
literally　the　application　of　an　ironbound　rule，“Divine　and　Rule”．　This　mode　of　ruling，　which
was　most　notably　carried　out　in　lndia　under　the　name　of“Ordinance　to　Divine　Benga1”，　came
to　provide　a　stimulus　to　the　formation　of　nation－states　among　Third　World　countries　which
found　it　urgent　to　be　independent　of　colonial　rules．　In　such　moves　the　question　of　national
integration　has　become　one　of　the　most　important　political　issues　that　these　countries
continue　to　face　ever　since　World　War　II．　Sociological　theories　also　maintain　that　the
historical　origin　of　major　political　issues　centering　around　the　existence　of　minorities　is　to　be
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sought　in　the　development　of　a　political　system　with　the　powerful　coercive　force，　that　is，　the
formation　of　a　nation－state．（5）Thus，　in　studying　the　dynamism　of　the　formation　of　nation－
states　in　the　Third　World　as　well　as　the　social　system　which　accomplishes　this　task，　minority
problems　and　the　question　of　communalism　posit　important　perspectives　for　analysis．　At　the
same　time，　an　analysis　of　the　minority　problems　will　inevitably　lead　to　that　of　the　majority
group，　in　the　present　case　the　problem　of　Muslim　Arabs，　since　the　existence　of　a　minority
group　within　a　society　becomes　problematic　always　in　relation　to　the　majority　group．
　　　　As　concrete　examples，　the　author　will　take　two　periods　in　history　when　the　relationships
between　the　Muslims　and　the　Coptic　Christian　communities　in　the　Middle　East　emerged　as
aserious　political　problem　which　would　endanger　the　existence　of　Egypt　as　a　modern　nation
－state．　The且rst　period　is　the　early　twentieth　century，　when，　under　the　British　colonial　rule，
the　independence　and　the　formation　of　a　nation－state　becalne　a　maj　or　political　issue．　The
second　period　is　during　President　Sadat　adopted　the　Open－Door　Policy（ゴ痂励α）．　As　a
general　introduction　the　author　will　first　comment　on　the　conflicts　between　the　Muslims　and
the　Copts　between　the　1910s　and　1970s，　and　then　describe　the　intra－and　inter－relationships　of
both　communities　that　form　the　backgroud　of　the　conflicts　during　these　two　periods．　Lastly，
the　author　will　compare　the　politico－economic　conditions　of　Egyptian　society・in　the　two
different　periods　and　analyze　the　role　of　religion，　in　order　to　reveal　the　mechanism　of　national
integration／disintegration　in　a　plural　society．
　　II．　The　Copts：ABrief　Historical　lntroduction
　　　The　Copts　and　Muslims　in　modern　Egypt　share　much　in　common　not　only　in　terms　of
their　appearance　but　also　with　respect　to　language　and　everyday－life　customs．　In　the　past，
one　could　see　that　a　person　was　a　Copt　by　way　of　his／her　name　and，　in　the　provices，　by　a
tattoo　of　cross．　Recently，　however，　there　are　more　names　used　both　by　the　Muslims　and
Copts，　and　the　custom　of　tattooing　is　also　fading　away．　Yet　their　intermarriage　is　still　rare
and　they　are　generally　recognized　as　different　ethnic　groups　who　have　different　religions　as
symbls　of　their　respective　group　identity．（6）
a）　The　Histoナy　of　the　Copts
‘　The　Christianization　of　Egypt　is　said　to　have　started　around　A．　D．41，　when　St．　Mark，　one
of　the　Twelve　Apostles，　assumed，　his　missionary　work　in　Alexandria．　By　the　second　century，
church　organization　had　been　established，　bringing　about　Christianization　to　the　whole　of
Egypt．　The　persecution　of　Christianity　by　the　Roman　Emperors　persisted　though　intermittent・
ly　from　the　early　third　century，　and　in　A．　D，284　in　particular，　about　800，000　Copts　were　said
to　be　martyred　as　a　result　of　the　persecution　by　the　Diocletianus　rule．　On　this　ground，　the　date
August　29　th　of　that　year　was　designated　as　the　beginning　of　the　Coptic　calendar．　But　the
Christians　in　Egypt　virtually　began　to　strengthen　their　identity　under　the　name　of　the　Coptic
Church　only　after　the　official　recognition　of　Christianity．　The　Patriarch　of　Alexandria，　the
central　body　of　the　Coptic　Church，　was　however　judged　to　be　heretical　due　to　its　advocacy
of　Monophysitism　at　the　Kalchedon　Conference　in　A．　D．451　concerning　the　divinity　of　Jesus
Christ．　As　a　result，　it　is　said，　the　Coptic　Church　became　separated　both　from　the　Eastern
Orthodox　and　the　Roman　Catholic　Churches．
　　　　However，　as　suggested　by　the　word“Copt”（θφσちArabic，　pl．）which　is　said　to　be　a
derivative　of　the　Greek　word　meaning　Egyptians（Aigmptz｛s），this　separation　of　the　Coptic
Church　can　be　interpreted　also　as　originating　from　two　other　factors　combined：on　one　hand，
the　native　Egyptian　peasants　in　support　of　the　Coptic　Church　wanted　to　be　independent　of　the
Byzantine　Empire　rule，　and　on　the　other，　the　Patriarch　of　Alexandria　sought　to　claim　its
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superiority　over　other　patriarchs．（7）Following　the　Kalchedon　Conference，　the　Byzantine
Emperor　sent　the　Patriarch　of　Melkite　to　Alexandria，　and　from　then　on，　the　Patriarch　of
Alexandria　had　to　seek　refuge　from　the　persecution　by　the　Byzantine　Empire，　moving　about
desert　monasteries　two　centuries　long．　In　effect，　however，　it　was　during　this　period　that　the
identity　as　a　Copt　became　even　more　distinct　among　the　Egyptian　Christians」n　this　context，
the　Arab　invasion　in　the　seventh　century　was　not　merely　an　invasion　of　the　heathen，1）ut　can
be　seen　rather　as　bringing　about　a　cessation　to　the　struggle　of　the　Copts　against　Byzantiqm．
As　a　result，　the　Pope　of　the　Coptic　Church　finally　returned　to　Alexandria，　and　the　Copts　came
to　be　treated　as　ahlα1－dhimma（dhimm　people　of　contract）．Later　on，　some　Copts　held
respectable　positions　in　the　Muslim　ruling　system　as　tax　collectors　and　accountants　though
maj　ority　of　the　Community　were　peasants．
　　　　Through　a　number　of　persecutions　during　the　period　of　the　Mamluk　Dynasty　and　of
Crusaders，　the　Egyptian　Coptic　population　was　converted　to　Islam　gradually，　and　already　in
the　fifteenth　century　the　Arabic　language　became　more　prevailing　than　Coptic．　Yet，　even
under　the　reign　of　Ottomans，　the　Copts　were　guaranteed　the　right　of　dhimml　to　maintain　their
own　religious　faith　and　custom　by　forming　an　autonomous　religious　community（milla）under
the　millet　system．　The　traditional　right　of　autonomy　of　the　milla　was　realized　in　their　church
operation，　waOf　management，　religious　court，　and　theological　college　management．　The
church　organizatior　consisted　of　chief　priest　（ku〃zzts），deputy　priest　（ki∬寛）　and　assistant’
priest（shan〃ziZs），and　the　status　of　bishop（uscus）above　these　three　was　exclusive　to　those
trained　as　monks．　Priests　were　allowed　to　marry　but　monks　were　not．　The　counties　were
decided　upon　by　the　conference　consisting　of　bishops　and　the　archimandrite。　Thus　the　power
of　the　church　was　executed　through　the　bishops　who　came　from　the　monk　class．　After　the
religious　court　was　abolished　in　1956　as　a　result　of　the　Nasserite　revolution，　milla’s　autonomy
lost　its　particularity　in　the　judiciary且eld　and　is　reminiscent　only　in　the　domain　of　the　family
law　governing　ceremonial　occasions，　But　the　church　is　still　inHuential　over　the　community
members　through　church　management，　waOf　management　and　Sunday　schools．
b）　Population
　　　　There　is　no　accurate　statistics　of　the　Copt　population．　According　to　the　1976　population
statistics，　only　6％of　the　total　Egyptian　population（38，228，180）were　Copts（2，315，560　in
the　absolute　number）．Yet　the　Coptic　Pope　Shunttda　III　said，　in　a　newspaper　interview　at　the
time　of　his　visit　to　USA　in　1977，　that　the　Copt　population　was　no　less　than　seven　million．（8）
If　so，　the　Copts　would　account　for　18％of　the　total　Egyptian　population．　With　regard　to　this
discrepancy，　the　Muslims　insist　that　the　Copts　announce　their　population　as　being　greater
than　it　actually　is，　so　that　they　would　have　a　greater　political　voice．　In　turn，　the　Copts
complain　that　the　government　underestimates　the　Copt　population　intentionally．　At　any　rate，
the　discrepancy　between　the　two　sides　concerning　the　Copt　population　is　an　evidence　of　the
fact　that　the　Coptic　problem　constitutes　a　sensitive　political　issue　in　Egypt．
　　III．　Emergence　of　the　Coptic　problem：1906－1919（Case　I）
　　　　The五rst　stage　of　the　Muslim－Copt　connicts　was　the　reign　of　British　colonialism，　under
which　Muslim　masses’emotional　attitudes　toward　the　Copts　became　aggravated　through
three　steps，　finally　leading　to　a　connict．　For　the且rst　time　in　Egyptian　history，“the　Coptic
problem”emerged　then　as　a　serious　political　issue．　The　whole　process　was　triggered　by　the
Danshaway　Incident　of　1906　which　gave　rise　to　Egyptian　nationalism
　　　As　widely　known，　this　incident，　which　started　with　a　clash　between　British　soldiers　and
Danshaway　villagers，　stimulated　and　stirred　up　rapidly　anti－British　sentiment　and　that　of
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national　independence　on　the　part　of　the　Egyptian　public．　At　the　same　time，　the　incident
created　a　situation　in　which　the　seeds　of　Muslim－Copt　conflict　were　sown．　The　anti－British
sentiment　grown　among　the　public　after　the　Denshaway　Incident　was　united　by　the　Watani
party，　whose　leader　Mu§tafa　Kamil　tried　to　mobilize　the　masses　toward　an　anti－British
movement　on　the　ground　of　Islam．　The　movement　therefore　did　not　really　developed　to
involve　t｛the　Coptic　population　sufficiently．　It　can　be　said　that　the　feeling　of　the　Copts　during
this　period　was　two－sided，　namely　anti－British　on　one　side　and　on　the　other　anxious　about　the
growing　Islamic　mass　movement　that　might　eventually　turn　out　antagonistic　to　the　Copts　in
genera1．
　　　　In　February　1910，　Egypt’s　prime　Minister　Butrus　Ghali　was　assassinated　by　a　young
Muslim　radical，　which　started　the　second　step　of　the　process．　The　cause　of　the　assassination
was　primarily　because　this　pro－British　Coptic　Prime　Minister　granted　Britain　the　right　to　use
the　Suez　Canal　until　the　year　2008　and　also　because　he　was　one　of　the　judges　of　the
Danshaway　Incident　trial．　The　assassination　led　to　an　outright　polemic　between　al－Liwa’，　an
organ　of　the　Watani　Party　which　defended　the　assassin，　andα1－PVatan，　a　Coptic　newspaper。
al－Liwa’waged　an　anti－Coptic　campaign　using　extremely『provocative　rhetorics∫9）In
response　to　the　campaign　the　Coptic　community　increased　the　apprehension　and　dispatched
adelegation　to　Britain　to　appeal　that　the　Copts　should　enjoy　sufficient　protection　as　a
minority　group　under　the　British　rule　and　that　they　should　be　treated　equally　to　the
Muslims．（10）However，　a　report　written　by　Sir　Eldon　Gorst　who　investigated　into　the　issue
claimed“Moslems　and　Copts　generally　live　together　quietly　if　they　are　Ieft　alone，　and　the
worst　possible　service　to　the　Copts　would　be　to　treat　them　as　a　separate　community．”（11）The
Copts　came　to　have　an　increased　feeling　of　isolation　due　to　the　development　of　Islamism　as
well　as　such　indifference　of　Britain，　which　led　them　to　hold　an　al1－Coptic　congress，　for　the
丘rst　time，　in　order　to　change　the　situation．
　　　　In　March　1911，　a　total　of’1，158　Coptic　representatives　from　various　districts　gathered　in
Asyut　and　called　for　equality　with　the　Muslims．　Their　appeals　included：1）demand　for
freedom　of　religious　education　at　public　schools；and　2）demand　for　more　posts　for　the　Copts
as　senior　public　officers．（12》The　government　had　been　in　opposition　to　the　congress　to　be　held
in　Asyut　in　fear　of　subversive　movement　in　the　district，　and　had　recommended　that　such　a
congress　be　held　in　Cairo　instead．　The　reason　why　the　government　made　such　a　recommenda－
tion　is　clear　from　the　population　statistics　of　1907．　While　there　were　only　50，000　Copts　in
Cairo　with　a　total　population　of　one　million，　there　were　200，000　Copts　in　Asyut　province　with
atotal　population　of　900，000．　The　government　thought，　it　seems，　that　if　held　in　Upper　Egypt
with　the　concentrated　Coptic　population，　the　congress　would　induce　troubles．　In　fact，　during
this　congress　actually　held　in　Asyut，　demonstrations　of　both　the　Coptic　and　Muslim　masses
as　well　as　harrassments　and　riots　occurred　frequently．
　　　　As　a　reaction　to　this　Coptic　congress，　the　Muslims　held　an　all－Muslim　congress　in
Heliopolis　in　the　suburbs　of　Cairo，　and　adopted　a　resolution　that　they　would　reject　all　the
demands　of　the　Copts．　Salama　MUsa，　a　Coptic　intellectual　of　modern　Egypt，　wrote　in　his
autobiography：“In　1911　the　Muslim－Copt　conflict　aroused　such　religious　antagonisms　that
Egyptians　almost　forgot　their　demands　for　independence　and　for　a　constitution．”（13）While　the
Muslim－Copt　relations　became　the　worst　in　1911，　Egyption　nationalist　movement　which
became　stronger　again　after　World　War　I　adopted、the　symbolic　slogan“Egypt　for　Egyptians”
in　place　of　Islamism．　Under　such　circumstances，　the　once　aggravated　Muslim－Copt　relations
were　absorbed，　for　the　time　being，　into　the　1919　revolutionary　movement．
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IV．　The　Muslim－Copt　Conflict：1972－1981（Case　II）
　　　More　recently，　the　conflict　between　the　Muslims　and　the　Copts　emerged　again　under　the
rule　of　Sadat．　This　conflict，　which　culminated　in　Sadat’s　assassination　on　October　6，1981，had
gone　through　in　its　aggravating　process　some　important　stages　subject　to　analysis．
　　　At　the　Khanka　Village　Incident　of　1972，　newspapers　became　busy　again　reporting　about
the　Mulsim－Copt　conflict　after　sixty　years’absence　since　early　this　century．　The　village　of
Khanka，　which　is　located　20km　north　of　Cairo，　is　with　a　small　population　of　about　20，000．
The　incident　started　one　night　when　the　building　of　the　Coptic　Bible　Society　in　the　village　was
set　on丘re　by　somebody．　The　Coptic　Church　dispatched　priests　from　Cairo　to　the　village　and
held　a　mass　to　show　their　protest．　In　response，　the　Muslims　organized　a　demonstration　and
went　so　far　as　to　destroy　real　estates　in　the　village　belonging　to　the　Copts．　The　government
reacted　to　this　incident　swiftly　and　took　a　Ineasure　to　reinforce　the　Presidential　power　to
protect　national　unity．（14）Even　after　this　measure，　however，　Muslim　radicals　continued　to　set
fire　on　a　number　of　Coptic　churches　mainly　in　Upper　Egypt．　In　response　to　this，　the　Coptic
Pope　Shunuda　III　pursued　vigorously　a　series　of　actions．　In　January　1977　he　held　a　convention
of　the　Coptic　Church　in　Alexandria　to　look　into　the　situation，　and　in　April　he　paid　a　visit　to
USA　for　the　first　time　in　the　Church’s　history　to　meet　with　President　Carter．　In　September
of　the　same　year，　he　performed　a　fast　to　show　his　protest，　at　the　same　time　sending　letters
to　Sadat，　Carter　and　the　Pope　in　the　Vatican　to　appeal　about　the　violation　of　the　Copts’
human　right　in　Egypt．　Further　in　1980，　ShunUda　III　ordered　the　Coptic　community　not　to　hold
official　ceremonies　of　Easter　in　protest　against　the　Shari‘a　Enactment　Law　which　had　been
proposed　by　Sadat　in　the　previous　year　as　well　as　the　lack　of　protection　for　the　Copts　by　the
Egyptian　government．
　　　President　Sadat　visited　USA　in　May　of　the　same　year，　where　he　was　confronted　with　all
anti－Sadat　demonstration　of　Coptic　residents　in　USA　in　front　of　the　White　House　in
Weshington，　D．　C．　Assuming　that　the　Coptic　Church　was　behind　this　demonstration，　Sadat
severely　attacked　ShunUda　III　in　his　parliamentary　address　after　returning　home，　and　banned
the　publication　of　Coptic　newspapers　and　the　holding　of　Sunday　schools，　thus　openly　revea・
1ing　his　outright　confrontation　with　ShunUda．（15）
　　In　1981，　the　Muslim－Copt　relation　became　still　more　strained，　and　in　June　a　three　day－riot
occurred　in　Zawiyya　al－Hamra’in　the　Cairo　area．　Zawiyya　al－Hamra’is　located　in　the
Sharabiyya　district，　north－east　of　Cairo，　which　is　right　the　boundary　area　between　the
metropolis　and　the　province．　As　the　result　of　population　migration　from　the　country　to　the
city，　the　population　of　this　district　has　been　rapidly　increasing．　In　particular，　Copts　have
moved　from　the　Minia　Province　to　this　district　in　great　numbers．　In　1979，　the　government
demolished　the　slum　area　in　Cairo’s　business　center　after　its　urban　redevelopment　plans，
which　forced　some　30，000　slum　inhabitants　of　about　5，000　households　to　be　relocated　to
Heliopolis　and　Zawiyya　al－Hamra’．　As　a　result，　people’s　anxiety　and　dissatisfaction　was
building　up　in　the　Zawiyya　al－Hamra’area　where　they　had　to　cope　with　inferior　living
conditions　in　very　limited　space．　Around　that　time，　a　riot　was　sparked　by　a　quarrel　between
neighbors，　and　this　expanded　to　an　armed　dispute　of　a　massive　scale　between　the　Muslims
and　the　Copts．（16）Newspaper　reports　say　that　it　resulted　in　the　death　of　10　people，55
casualties，　and　the　arrest　of　113　people．　After　this　riot，　bombing　of　Coptic　churches　was
continued　by　Muslim　radicals．　To　repress　both　the　Copts　and　Muslim　radicals，　Sadat　arrested
alarge　number　of　anti－establishment　elements　on　September　3．　Further，　on　September　6，
Sadat　dismissed　Shunada　III，　putting　him　in　exile　at　a　monastery　in　Wadi　Natrun，　and
appointed　five　bishops　in　his　place．　In　an　address　given　at　the　parliament　Sadat　said，“Both
ShunUda　and　Islam　fundamentalists　threatened　the　unity　of　Egypt，”as　an　explanation　of　the
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reason　for　the　arrests　and　Pope’s　dismissal．（17）Amonth　later，　on　October　6，　Sadat　himself　was
assassinated　by　a　Muslim　radical　at　the　ceremony　commemorating　the　Arab　victory　in　the
Fourth　Middle　East　War．
V．Background　of　the　Problem（Case　I）
　　　The　Muslim－Copt　relations　during　both　periods　mentioned　always　took，　on　the　surface，
the　form　of　religious　conflicts．　Yet　the　background　of　the　conflicts　is　more　complicated　and，
in　fact　these　conflicts　represent　extremely　political　issues　rather　than　religious．　In　order　to
discern　what　actually　the　issue　was，　one　has　to　analyze　the　political　structures　of　the　two
communities　that　constituted　the　background　of　the　conflicts．
a）Political　Structure　of　the　Muslim　Community
　　　　After　18820n，　Egypt　was　ruled　by　the　khedive　under　the　nominal　suzerain　Ottoman
Empire，　but　Egypt’s　actual　supreme　rights　of　sovereignty　were　held　by　the　British　consu1．
Thus，　Egypt　was　then　presenting　a　three－tiered　ruling　structure．‘Abbas　Hilmi　II，　who　was　the
khedive　at　the　time　when　the　Coptic　problem　emerged，　made　every　effort　to　mitigate　British
infiuence；he　approached　the　Turks　and　supported　the　anti－British　Muslim　movement．　The
Umma　Party，　one　of　the　major　political　parties，　was　Ied　by　Alymad　Lutfi　al－Sayyid　and
supported　by　big　land　owners，　senior　bureaucrats　and　intellectuals．　The　Watani　Party
supported　by　students，　urban　masses　and　peasants　waged，　as　mentioned　previously，　a　nation－
alist　movement　based　on　Pan－lslamism　as　an　effective　anti－British　political　means．　The
Constitutional　Party　was　nothing　but　a　cavalier　party　patronaged　by　the　khedive．　Of　the
three，　it　was　the　Watani　Party　that　waged　an　anti－Coptic　campaign　after　the　assassination
of　Butrus　Ghali　in　1910．　The　Watani　Party　was　then　led　by　Shaykh　Abd　al－Aziz　Jawish，　after
the　death　of　Mu＄tafa　Kamil　in　1908．　The　support　basis　of　this　party　was　formed　by　the
masses，　and　this　fact　supplied　good　grounds　for　the　Coptic　problem　to　grow　serious．
b）　Confrontation　inside　the　Coptic　Community
　　　　Like　the　Muslim　community，　the　Coptic　community　in　modern　times　also　underwent　a
major　social　change．　While　the　Muslims　were　subjected　to　Mゆammad‘Ali’s　modernization
policy　and　Shaykh　Mゆammad‘Abduh’s　Islamic　modernization，　the　Copts　introduced
reforms　into　the　Church　itself，　which　was　started　in　direct　response　to　the　threat　of　American
protestant　missionary　activities．　British　and　American　missions，　with　the　Evangelists　as　the
major　group，　made　an　Arabic　translation　of　the　Bible　and　undertook　dedicated　missionary
activities　centering　around　Sunday　school．　As　a　result，　an　increasing　number　of　Copts　started
convert　into　Protestantism．　Facing　such　a　situation，　the　Coptic　Church　came　to　realize　that
they　could　not　sit　back　idly　any　longer　on　their　tradition．　Kyrilus　II（throne；1954－1961），who
is　called　father　of　the　Coptic　Church　reform，　reeducaced　the　monks，　adopted　a　salary　system
for　them，　founded　modern　Coptic　schools　and　reorganized　wa（ガ（religious　endowment＞to
finance　these　reforms．（18）He　also　approached　the　Greek　Orthodox　Church　and　Britain’s
Anglican　Church　for　the　unification　of　Christians．　He　died，　however，　in　the　midst　of　these
attempts，　which　reportedly　spread　a　rumor　at　that　time　that　he　was　poisoned　to　death　by
Khedive　Sa‘Id　who　was　opposed　to　Kyrilus　II’s　approach　to　the　Russian　Orthodox　Church．（19｝
During　the　reign　of　his　successor　Demitrius　II（throne；1864－1870），the　move　toward　a　reform
became　weak，　and　after　his　death　there　was　a　four－year　vacancy　of　the　throne　until　the
coming　of　a　new　Pope．　During　this　period　of　vacancy，　a　Coptic　counci1（ル吻傭al－Millの
which　consisted　of　twelve　influencial　secular　Copts　headed　by　Bu㌻rus　Ghall　was　formed　for
the丘rst　time　in　order　to　control　the丘nance　of　the　Church．　Milli　members　were　government
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officials　comparable　to　the　status　of　deputy　minister，　and　their　term　of　service　was　five
years．（20）
　　　In　1874，　Kyrilus　V（throne；1874－1927）came　to　power，　which　turned　out　to　mark　the
beginning　of　the　confrontation　between　Milli　members　and　the　Coptic　Church　continuing　into
Nasser’s　time．　The　issue　at　stake　was　which　of　the　two　groups　should　have　the　right　to
control　waqf，　the　main　source　of　funds　for　important　activities　of　community’s　autonomy
such　as　the　running　of　the　church　establishment，　schools　and　charitable　projects．　The
members　of　the　council　Majlis　al－Milli，　who　claimed　to　be　reformists，　requested　that　they
should　be　given　the　right　to　control　waqf　in　order　to　work　toward　secularization　of　commu・
nity　activities．　As　Kyrilus　V　would　not　transfer　the　right　to　control　waqf，　the　reformists　who
gained　the　support　of　Lord　Cromer　and　the　recognition　by　the　khedive　requested　the　British
to　dismiss　Kyrilus　V．　As　a　result，　he　was　exiled　to　the　monastery　at　Wadi　Natrun　in　1892．　On
the　other　hand，　the　Coptic　masses　supported　Kyrilus，　which　resulted　in　the　suspension　of　all
the　community　activities　including　marriage　and　funeral．　Owing　to　this　situation，　Kyrilus　V
managed　to　return　to　Cairo　a　year　later，　in　1893．　It　is　said　that　he　wes　enthusiastically
welcomed　back　to　Cairo　both　by　Muslim　and　Coptic　masses　because　his　return　meant　to　them
nothing　but　a　counter－attack　against　the　British　rule．　Afterwards，　however，　specifically　since
1906the　Muslim　masses　became　antagonistic　to　the　Copts，　and　the　reformists　resumed　their
activities　in　order　to　get　hold　of　the　right　to　control　the　Church．　The　campaign　aiming　at　the
holding　of　the　congress　in　Asyut　was　a　part　of　such　activities．　It　was　in　this　context　that
Kyrilus　opposed　the　holding　of　the　congress．　What　was　lying　behind　the　confrontation
between　Kyrilus　and　the　reformists　over　the　right　to　control　waqf　can　be　made　clearer　when
the　family　background　of　the　reformist　members　is　scrutinized．　They　were　big　landowners
and　managers　of　the　light　industries，　in　other　words　the　members　of　the　bourgeois　or　the　new
elites　class　of　the　Coptic　community，　who　could　get　profit　from　the　modemization　policies．　lt
is　very　possible　that　they　were　conspiring　to　liquidate　the　framework　or　the　millet　system　by
controlling　waqf　and　secularizing　community　activities．（21）
　　　On　the　other　hand，　many　monks　on　the　side　of　the　Church　represented　by　Kyrilus　V　c．ame
from　the　poor　peasant　class（彦1励魏），as　in　the　case　of　Kyrilus　himself．　Thus　the　division
between　Kyrilus’s　faction　and　the　reformists　coincided　with　the　division　of　classes　within　the
Coptic　community．　After　all，　what　Kyrilus　wished　to　see　and　protect　gan　be　considered　the
stability　of　the　Coptic　community　within　the　changing　society．　This　means，　he　had　to　protect
the　millet　system　centering　around　the　Church　that　manifested　the　conventional　social　order．
A　collapse　of　the　millet　system　would　mean　nothing　but　instability　of　the　Coptic　community
as　well　as　scale－down　of　the　Church　activities．　Being　aware　of　this，　Kyrilus　resisted　by　all
means　to　transfer　the　right　to　control　waqf　to　the　reformists．　The　reformists，　however，　who
were　becoming　increasingly　important　as　big　landowners　and　Iight　industrial　managers，　were
looking　for　greater　market　and　field　of　activities　beyond　the　Coptic　community　alone．　In　this
context，　the　millet　system　itself　would　restrain　their　activities，　and　the　objective　of　the
reformists　was　then　to　break　the　framework　of　the　millet　system　itself　by　controlling　waqf
and　secularizing　the　community　system．　In　short，　the　struggle　over　the　right　to　control　waqf
was　a　manifestation　of　the　divided　structure　of　the　Coptic　community；the　general　populace
who　was　left　behind　the　economic　development　in　the　midst　of　the　social　structural　change
came　to　endorse　the　authority　of　the　Church　in　pursuit　of　stability，　whereas　the　new　elites
aspired　to　transcend　the　limited　framework　of　the　millet　system．　Then，　the　question　is　where
the　new　Coptic　bourgeoisie　would　seek　their　identity，　without　the　support　of　the　Coptic
masses．　The　answer　to　this　question　can　be　found　in　the　birth　of　the　Wafd　Party　that
furnished　the　foundation　for　the　new　bourgeoisie　to　pursue　their　demand．
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c）British　Rule　and　the　Birth　of　the　Wafd　Party
　　　　From　Lord　Cromer　to　Sir　Gorst　the　British　authorities　consistently　held　the　position　that
no　Coptic　problem　existed　in　Egypt．　But　British　attitude　changed　shortly　before　World　War
I．They　withdrew　their　support　for　the　Coptic　reformists，　began　to　seve七ely　oppress　Egypt’s
nationalist　movment，　and　made　Britain’s　colonial　policy　all　the　more　restrictive．　Back　home
in　Britain，　newspapers　began　to　report　actively　about“fanatic　Muslims”as　well　as“the
Coptic　problem”，　the　existence　of　which　they　had　previously　denied　officially．（22）
　　　Under　such　circumstances，　the　Muslim－Copt　conflict　came　to　a　turning　point．　Sa‘d
Zaghlal　founded　a　new　political　party　called　the　Wafd　Party　after　World　War　1．　The　party
adopted　the　slogan“Egypt　for　Egyptians”and　succeeded　in　mobilizing　the　masses　by
promoting　secular　nationalism．　The　Coptic　bourgeoisie　also　participated　in　the　Wafd　Party
and　some　of　them　became　its　active　members．　This　Wafd　Party　actually　came　to　lead　the
1919revolution　and　continued　to　play　a　key　role　in　the　party　politics　of　Egypt　between　the
national　independence　of　1923　and　the　ban　on　political　parties　by　the　Nasserite　revolution　of
1952．
VI．　Background　of　the　problem（Case　II）
a）Crisis　of　the　Muslim　Community
　　　　Sadat，　who　succeeded　to　Nasser　in　1970　following　his　death，　brought　victory　in　19730ver
the　Fourth　Middle　East　War　and　reinforced　the　basis　of　his　regime．　The　Sadat　establishment，
however，　came　to　an　end　in　1981　at　his　assassination．　We　will　look　at　then　how　the　Muslim
－Copt　conflict　emerged　under　his　regime．　The　Sadat　establishment　was　based　on　two　key
policies：the　political　policy　for　peace　negotiations　with　Israel　and　the　economic　open－door
policy　σ痂飯加）．　Since　about　丘ve　years　before　Sadat’s　assassination，　political　tensions
concerning　the　former　policy　grew　together　with　the　economic　crisis．　In　order　to　reconstruct
the　country’s　economy　weakened　by　repeated　wars，　Sadat　tried　to　develop　domestic　private
capital　by　promoting　peace　with　Israel　and　introducing　foreign　capita1，　These　policies，
however，　turned　out　to　invite　a　situation　in　which　profits　were　distributed　only　among　a
handful　of　capitalists　and　the　majority　of　people　suffered　from　inflation　and　an　increased
income　gap．　The　dissatisfaction　of　the　masses　took　a　form　of　a　price　riot　in　1977．　This　riot
was　an　extention，　on　a　national　scale，　of　localize　demonstrations　in　Cairo　and　Alexandria
against　the　government　decision　on　the　reduction　of　subsidy　for　everyday　goods　and　on　the
increase　in　prices　of　daily　necessities　such　as　bread　and　beans．　Although　the　government
mobilized　the　military　and　ordered　a　curfew　in　an　attempt　to　restore　public　peace，　it　had　to
withdraw　the　bill　for　price　increase　in　the　end．　In　February，　Sadat　made　a　strong　request　to
USA，　Arab　oil－producing　countries　and　IMF（International　Monetary　Fund）for　aid，
contradicting　his　own　statement，“our　economic　policy　is　not　a　failure”．
　　　　At　the　same　time，　anti－government　movement　grew　more　active，　with　the　Islamic
radicals　as　the　main　force．　In　July　1977，　there　occurred　a　fatal　abduction　of　Waqf　Minister
and　bombing　of　movie　theaters　in　Zamalik　and　Agaza．　Foreign　Minister　Ismail　Fahmi
resigned　in　November　in　protest　against　Sadat’s　pro－Israeli　policy．　In　order　to　overcome　the
crisis，　Sadat　appointed　Butrus　Butrus　Ghali，　who　is　a　Copt，　to　the　foreign　minister　position．
Sadat　visited　Jerusalem　on　November、19，　and　about　one　and　a　half　years　later　in　March　1979
1srae1－Egypt　peace　Treaty　was　concluded．　In　recognition　of　this　merit，　Sadat，　along　with
Begin，　received　Nobel　peace　prize．　At　home　in　Egypt，　in　the　contrary，　anti－establishment
forces　opposed　the　Treaty，　so　that　it　became　imperative　for　Sadat　to　suppress　their　activities，
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especially　those　of　Muslim　radicals．　Beginning　around　that　time，　a　series　of　attacks　by
Muslim　radicals　against　Copts　occurred．　Faced　with　this　situation，　the　Coptic　Church　became
increasingly　discontented　with　the　government．　In　May　1980　President　Sadat，　in　his　parlia－
mentary　address　immediately　after　returning　from　USA　where　he　was　confronted　with　an
anti－Sadat　demonstration，　accused　the　Copts　saying　that　they　were　trying　to　build　their　own
state，　and　place　a　ban　on　Coptic　newspapers　and　Sunday　schools．　Further，　he　gave　a　speech
blaming　the　Copts　for　their　overseas　political　activities　that　they　were　exerting　pressure　on
Egyp’t　Islamic　nature　through　their　overseas　organizations，　thus　strongly　revealing　his
identity　as　a　Mulsim　ruler　of　a　Muslim　state．（23）
　　　It　was　under　such　circumstances　that　in　June　1981　another　Mulsim－Copt　connict　occurred
in　the　worst　manner　in　Zawiyya　Al－Hamra’．　In　early　September，　Sadat　set　out　with　oppres・
sion　of　anti－establishment　elements，　with　a　scale　unprecedented　during　his　rule，　to　suppress
subversive　activities　in　the　country．　The　government　arrested　a　total　of　1，536　j　ournalists，
educators　and　religious　leaders　irrespective　of　their　Coptic　or　Muslim　background．　Many　of
those　arrested　were　Muslim　radicals　affiliated　with　such　organizations　as　the　Muslim
Brethren，　but　among　the　rest　there　were　former　Deputy－Premier　Abdil　Kalam，　nine　former
cabinet　members　including　former　Information　Minister　and　journalist　Mubammad　Heikal，
twelve　opposition　politicians，　sixteen　lawyers，　and　150　Coptic　adherents　including　eight
bishops．　Subsequently，　the　government　exiled　ShunUda　III　to　the　monastery　in　Wadi　NatrUn．
In　his　parliamentary　address　on　September　6，　Sadat　explained　the　reason　for　these　measures
as　follows：“Both　Shunifda　and　Muslim　fundamentalists　threatened　Egypt’s　unity．”（24）
　　　　On　October　6，　a　military　parade　commemorating　the　triumph　of　the　Fourth　Middle　East
War　was　held　in　the　suburbs　of　Cairo．　As　a　military　truck　was　passing　in　front　of　the
inspection　podium，　four　soldiers　jumped　off　the　truck，　and　almost　simultaneously　hand
grenades　were　thrown　at　the　podium　and　automatic　rines　were丘red　at　the　President．　He　was
taken　to　the　Army　Hospital　and　died　there．　Vice－President　Mubarak　was　appointed　as　his
successor　on　the　next　day．　But　on　Dctober　8，　the　police　headquarters　in　Asyut　was　attacked
by　radicals　and　the　tension　became　acuter．　Sadat’s　assassination　was　not　an　isolated　conspir－
acy　but　a　part　of　a　larger－scale　plan　by　Muslim　radicals　to　overthrow　the　government，　which
was　also　connected　with　the　attack　on　the　police　headquarters　in　Asyut．（25）
b）　Reaction　of　the　Coptic　Community
　　　　The　period　of　several　years　leading　to　Sadat’s　death　was　the　most　turbulent　period　for
Egyptian　society　since　1952．　What　sort　of　changes　did　the　Coptic　community　experience
during　that　periodP　The　struggle　between　the　Church　and　reformist　during　the　previous　period
、for　the　waqf　control　in　the　Coptic　community　continued　to　Nasser’s　time　in　such　a　way　as　the
control　remained　in　the　hands　of　the　Church，　at　least　on　the　surface．　Yet　the　framework　of
the　millet　system　itself，　which　was　constituting　the　main　theme　of　the　problem，　already　Iost
its　binding　force　following　the　abolition　of　the　Religious　Court　after　the　Nasserite　revolution．
The　contemporary　issue　of　the　Coptic　community　is　the　internal　split　of　the　Church　as　well
as　the　activities　of　Coptic　radicals　responsive　to　Muslim　radicals，
　　　　The　changes　found　in　the　Coptic　Church　in　comparison　to　early　this　century　may　be
viewed　from　two　aspects，　namely　its　members　and　system．　with　regard　to　the　members，　most
monks　until　early　this　century　came　from　the　poverty　class　of　the　community，　while　from
around　the　1930s　and　40s　graduates　of　modern　theological　and　universities　started　to　become
monks．　This　tendency　is　expressed　even　more　clearly　after　the　revolution．　It　seems　that　the
l言謝£畿£h黙鑑゜宅1潔t，皇皇器1濃el，磯1濃灘t離濫留al
m・・・・…ym・v・m・卜・w…hw・・1・db・B・・h・pM・ttaal－M・・k…w・・h・h・A・・K・m・1
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Monastery　as　a　center，　became　active　from　the　1960s　and　attracted　many　young　people．（26）As
to　the　system，　a　system　of　bishops　without　portfolio（without　any　specific　bishopric　in　charge）
was　newly　introduced　in　the　1960s，　and　three　bishops　were　assigned　to　those　positions．　Bishop
Samwil，　one　of　there　three，　was　in　charge　of　controlling　waqf　and　also　in　the　foreign　minister
position　within　the　Coptic　Church．　He　was　killed　on　the　inspection　podium　at　the　time　of
Sadat’s　assassination．　It　was　reported　then　that　a　trust　deposit　of　eleven　million　UK　pounds
was　found　in　his　name　at　the　Swiss　Bank．（27｝This　deposit　was　cosidered　a　part　of　the　waqf
asset，　which　suggests　that　the　scale　of　waqf　assets　should　be　enormous．　Other　two　bishops
without　portfolio　were　Bishop　Gregorius　who　was　in　charge　of　consolidathig　the　Church’s
protocol，　and　ShunUda　who　was　then　in　charge　of　Sunday　schogls　and　theology　colleges　and
Iater　became　pope．　The　Friday　seminar　held　by　ShunUda　attracted　about　10，000participants，
which　suggested　his　charismatic　popularity．　Among　the　there，　however，　there　were　opposing
opinions　between　Shu而da，　who　insisted　that　the　Church　should　involve　every　matter　of　Iife，
and　Miskin　who　maintained　that　the　Church　should　concern　itself　only　with　the　conscience　of
individuals．　After　Shunロda’s　exile，　Miskin　issued　a　statement　to　recognize　the　measures　that
were　taken　by　Sadat．（28）
　　　　With　respect　to　present　activities　of　the　Coptic　community　there　are　two　points　worth
noting　which　were　referred　to　by　Sadat　in　his　parliamentary　address　in　May　and　July　of　1980．
The丘rst　is　about　overseas　political　activities　of　the　Coptic　community．　The　number　of　Copt
emigrants　abroad　began　to　increase　during　the　1950s，　and　currently　there　are　approximately
50，000Copts　in　USA　and　35，000　in　Canada．（29）As　the　number　of　emigrants　increased，　overseas
Coptic　organizations　came　to　existence，　and　at　present　there　are　a　total．of　sixteen　Coptic
churches　in　USA　and　Canada．　Also，　the　Coptic　Church　is　a　member　of　the　world　Christian
Congress（WCC），aworld－wide　organization　which　was　established　in　1948　by　the　American
protestant　and　Eastern　Orthodox　Churches．　WCC’s　main　objective　is　to　promote　ecumenism，
but　the　fact　that　it　includes　USSR’s　Greek　Orthodox　Church　in　particular　implies　its
anti－communist　chracter．　Such　a　suspicion　can　be　strengthened　further　by　the　fact　that　John
Foster　Dulles，　the　core　advocator　of　USA’s　Cold　War　policy，　was　one　of　the　founding
chairmen　of　WCC．　At　any　rate，　it　is　con丘rmed　that　WCC　acts　very　politically　particularly
when　it　deals　with　the　Third　world．（3°）The　Coptic　Church　joined　WCC　already　during　the　time
of　Nasser，　and　it　seems　that　Nasser　considered　this　entry　a　preliminary　step　toward　the
foundation　of　positive　relationship　with　the　Christian　society，　which　Egypt　would　need　at　the
time　of　war　with　lsrael．　Heikal　pointed　out　that　WCC’s　fund　is　sent　to　Matta　al－Miskin’s
monastery．　This　indication　draws　attention，　when　considered　along　with　the　troubled　rela－
tionship　between　Miskin　and　ShunUda．（31）
　　　　Another　noteworthy　point’raised　in　Sadat’s　parliamentary　address　is　thatヒ℃opts　are
trying　to　build　their　own　state．”The　movement　aiming　at　the　establishment　of　a　Coptic　state
（Ummaα1－O’∂勿クのwas　mentioned　already　in　1911　in　the　accusation　made　by　the　Muslims
at　the　time　of　the　Muslim－Copt　connict．（32）Later，　around　the　eve　of　the　revolution　at　the　end
of　the　1940s，　another　movent　for　an　independent　Coptic　state　emerged　again　among　the　youth．
This　group　attempted　to　abduct　the　pope　in　1954　and　became　subjected　to　oppression　ever
since　then．　Yet　after　Kyril　Vl　came　to　the　seat　in　1959　during　Nasserヒs　rule，　the　Muslim－Copt
relations　on　the　whole　seemed　to　be　carried　on　smoothly．　In　1965，　for　instance，　Nasser　gave
permission　not　only　for　the　construction　of　St．　Mark’s　Cathedral　even　with五nancial　support，
but　also　for　the　Copt　plan　to　construct　25　churches　each　year．　He　was　also　sensitive　about
securing　an　adequate　proportion　of　Copts　among　bureaucrats．（33）The　Third　Middle　East　War
of　1967，　however，　gave　rise　to　a　deep　sense　of　crisis　both　among　Muslim　and　Coptic　youth．
While　Muslim　youth　organized　various　religious　groups（iama‘クt）on　university　campuses，
Coptic　youth　began　to　develop　their　own　religious　movements．（34）Under　Nasser’s　rule　where
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the　formation　of　political　organization　was　banned，　any　anti－establishment　movement　had　no
other　way　than　getting　organized　under　the　symbol　of　religion．　This　situation　increased　the
possibility　of　a　clash　between　the　two　sides，　although　an　actual　conflict　was　more　or　less
prevented　in　Nasser’s　lifetime．　Yet　this　confrontation　developed，　after　Sadat　took　presiden・
tial　office　in　1970　following　Nasser’s　death　and　ShunUda　III　became　pope　in　1971，　finally　into
Muslim－Copt　conHict　for　the　second　time　since　the　beginning　of　this　century．
　　　　The　Khanka　Village　Incident　of　1972　was　not　a　mere　quarral　among　the　villagers，　but　in
the　backdrop　there　was　a　certain　instigation　by　the　Muslim　Brethren．㈹In　Egypt　the　construc・
tion　of　churches　is　still　regulated　by　the　Ottoman　proclamation，　and　the　Church’s　position　is
limited　to　such　that　no　missionary　activity　is　allowed　although　the　autonomy　of　the　Church
is　recognized．　Also，　a　permission　for　church　construction　is　difficult　and　time－consuming　to
obtain．　Nasser’s　promise　to　permit　the　construction　of　25　churches　each　year　was　not　kept
after　all，　thus　limiting　the　number　of　churches　constructed　in　the　60s　only　to　68．（36）At　the
beginning　of　his　term　of　office　Sadat　even　promised　to　permit　the　construction　of　50　churches
per　year，　but　this　was　neither　realized．　On　the　other　hand，　extremely　rapid　population
increase　and　economic　inflation　resulted　in　a　great　influx　of　population　into　cities　from
countryside．　In　the　outskirts　of　Cairo　in　particular，　the　rapid　population　increase　caused　a
serious　aggravation　of　the　living　environment．（37）Inevitably，　a　serious　lack　of　churches　in　such
districts　became　obvious，　which　made　the　Church　to　take　such　measures　as　purchasing　land
in　the　name　of　indivduals，　building　shopping　streets，　starting　schools　in　those　facilities　and
gradually　turning　some　of　them　into　churches．　The　Bible　Society　which　was　burnt　in　Khanka
was　also　a　building　of　such　character，　and　this　was　why　it　was　attacked　by　the　Muslim
Brethren．（38》Similarly，　the　riot　in　Zawiyya　al－Hamra’was　a　case　of　connict　between　Muslim
and　Coptic　radicals　over　the　use　of　a　vacant　land　rather　than　a　mere　clash　between　groups
of　inhabitants．（39）
　　　　Faced　with　such　a　situation，　the　Coptic　Church　tried　as　much　as　possible　to　avoid
confrontation　with　the　Muslims，　with　the　aim　to　secure　the　stability　of　the　Coptic　community
within　the　Arab　world．　For　example，　after　the　signing　of　the　peace　Treaty　with　Israel，　Sadat
requested　Shunada　III　to　resume　pilgrimages　to　Jerusalem　which　had　been　suspended　since
1967．But　Shunttda　reportedly　refused　the　request　by　saying：ttThe　problem　separating　Egypt
from　the　Arab　world　will　be　solved　eventually．　With　that　in　Inind，　I　am　determined　to　see　to
it　that　Egypt　would　not　label　the　Copts　as　traitors　of　the　Arab　world．更更（40｝
　　　　ShunUda　was　allowed　tb　return　to　Cairo　to　celebrate　Christmas　on　the　Coptic　calendar
finally，　after　he　was　kept　in　exile　for　three　years　and　four　months．
　　c）The　Mubarak　Regime　and　Revival　of　the　New　Wafd　Party
　　　The　present　Mubarak，　successor　to　Sadat，　introduced　some　modi丘cations　into　the
political　scene，　while　following　the　basic　lines　of　Sadat’s　policy．　Among　other，　he　restored　a
dialogue　with　the　anti－establishment　groups　and　cleared　away　the　corruption　among　officials
under　the　infitaha　policy．　After　the　overwhelming　victory　of　the　ruling　party　in　the　1984
election，　which　was　actually　largely丘xed，　the　new　regime　under　Mubarak’s　leadership　is　now
reinforcing　its　foundation．
　　　What　should　be　noted　concerning　the　1984　election　is　the　revival　of　the　New　Wafd　Party
（NWP）．At　this　election，　the　ruling　National　Democratic　Party（NDP）achieved　an　over・
whelming　victory　by　winning　87％of　the　seats．　None　of　the　opposition　parties　such　as　the
Social　Labor　Party（SLP），　the　Liberal　Socialist　Party（LSP）and　the　United　Nationa1，
Progress　Party（UNPP）could　get　even　a　single　seat，　whereas　the　New　Wafd　Party　which
was　newly　founded　in　1978　won　13％of　the　seats　and　became　the　largest　opposition　party　in
place　of　SLP．（41）When　the　New　Wafd　Party　was　founded　in　1978，　the　government　described
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it　as　cta　party　whose　members　include　corrupted　politicians　who　were　active　prior　to　1952，”
and丘1ed　a　case　against　NWP　in　the　Supreme　Court　claiming　the　illegality　of　the　party’s
political　activities．　Nevertheless，　the　Supreme　Court　recognized　in　1984　that　NWP　waS
constitutional　as　a　political　party，　which　allowed　NWP　to　take　part　in　the　election　of　1984
for　the丘rst　time　since　the　1952　revolution．（42）
　　　It　is　suggested　that　NWP’s　success　was　due　to　the　political　constituency　it　had
maintained　since　the　time　of　its　predescessor　the　Wafd　Party，　but　its　cooperation　with　the
Muslim　Brethren　is　also　said　to　be　one　of　the　reasons　for　NWP《s　success，　which　has　aroused
much　discussion．〔43）The　New　Wafd　Party，　in　response，　explains　that　its　alleged　cooperation
with　the　Muslim　Brethren　is　an　intentional　and　exaggerated　interpretation　by　the　government
who　is　afraid　of　possible　formation　of　a　cooperative　relation　between　the　Copts　and　the　pro
－Wafd　groups．（44）
VII．　Analysis　of　the　Problem
　　　We　have　looked　at　the　generative　processes　and　social　backgrounds　of　the　conflicts　that
emerged　in　two　different　periods　in　modern　and　contemporary　history．　Finally，　I　will　compare
the　two　cases　and　try　to　elucidate　the　conditions　under　which　heterogeneous　com‘munities
come　into　conflict．　To　furnish　a　comparative　ground　for　the　two　cases，　both　political
economic　environments　will　be　analyzed　first，　and　then　the　background　of　the　religious
movements，　which　were　manifested　in　the　form　of　conflict，　will　be　examined．
a）　Political　Environment
　　　　The　political　environment　of　the　Muslim　community　in　Case　I　can　be　described　within　the
framework　of　Egypt’s　anti－British　movement．　The　ideological　symbols　to　achieve　this
movement　were　Islamism　and　the　nation－building　of　Egypt．　The　axis　of　the　movement
oscillated　between　these　two　symbols　and　ultimately　shifted　from　the　former　to　the　latter　in
mobilizing　the　masses．　When　Prime　Minister　Ghali　was　assassinated，　who　was　regarded　as
acollaborator　of　the　British　government，　Pan－Islamism　was　combined　with　the　ideology　of
Muslim　radicals．　Then，　condemnation　against　the　Copts　bursted　out　along　with　the　general
masses’emotional　hatred　toward　the　Copts，　which　gave　rise　to　the　Muslim－Copt　connict．
　　　On　the　other　hand，　the　enviroment　of　the　Copt　side　at　that　time　can　be　described　within
the　framework　of　conflict　between　reformists　and　the　Church　inside　the　Coptic　community
over　the　right　to　control　waqf，　the　holding　of　which　was　to　ensure　the　initiative　in　preserving／
dissolving　the　millet　system．　The　church　adhered　to　the　right　to　control　waqf　soly　because
waqf　was　the　maj　or　source　of　ftlnd　for　supporting　the　community’s　social　system．　Yet，　as　a
result　of　the　formation　of　the　Wafd　Party，　Copts’reformist　group　consisting　of　the　bourgeoi・
sie　came　to　have　a　basis　for　political　activities　to　develop　the　new　Muslim　bourgeoisie　with
whom　they　shared　common．　economic　interests。　Thus，　the　concern　of　Copts’reformists　moved
from　the　distribution　of　bene五t　within　the　Coptic　community　to　the　pursuit　of　a　greater
economic　community，　that　is，　the　nation－building　of　Egypt，　which　they　might　accomplish　in
collaboration　with　the　Muslims．　On　the　contrary，　the　Coptic　masses　came　to　reassure　their
Coptic　identity　more　strongly　with　the　Church　power　which　was　adhering　to　the　autonomous
millet　system．　Thus　the　question　of　national　integration　was　carried　over　to　the　periods　to
follow．（45）
　　　Egypt’s　policies　during　the　time　of　Case　II　can　be　analyzed　with　reference　to　the　political
environment　of　peace　diplomacy　with　Israel．　Ideology　in　favor　of　the　policy　was“Egypt’s
bene趾：Egyptism”，　and　the　opposing　ideologies　to　this　were“Arab’s　Cause／Arabism”and
“Islam　fundamentalism”．　Sadat　came　to　face　a　crisis　when　foreign　ministers　resigned　succes・
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sively　in　protest　against　his　visit　to　Jerusalem，　but　then　overcame　this　crisis　finally　to　have
the　Peace　Treaty　signed，　by　appointing　Butrus　Bu㌻rus　Ghali　to　the　foreign　minister　post，　who
was　ironically　enough　a　grandson　of　former　Foreign　Minister　Butrus　Ghali，　a　victim　of
assassination　in　Case　I．　Yet，　attacks　on　Copts　started　again　when　the　radicals　opposing　Sadat’
spolicy　became　united　with　the　Islam　fundamentalist．
　　　　On　the　part　of　the　Coptic　community，　although　the　millet　system　was　dissolved　after　the
Nasserite　revolution，　the　Church　virtually　continued　to　maintain　its　right　to　control　waqf，
keeping　its　authoritative　influence　over　the　Coptic　community　intact．　Yet，　the　Church　power
structure　itself　contained　disruptive　elements　covertly　such　as　the　confrontation　between
ShunUda　and　Miskin．　Also，　as　seen　in　the　Pope’s　abduction　incident　in　1954，　a　group　of　Coptic
radicals　has　been　strengthening　its　movement　in　parallel　with　that　of　Muslim　radicals．　This
Coptic　group　is　dissatisfied　with　their　position　as　being　a　minority　in　a　nation・state　and　is
pursuing　an　independent　Coptic　state．　For　instance，　more　and　more　Copts，　particularly　the
youth，　complain　that　their　position　is　not　adequately　represented　in　the　political　arena．㈹In
the　form　of　clash　between　the　two　radical　groups，　the　Muslim・Copt　conflict　has　then　come　to
bring　forth　an　idea　of　communalism　which　would　lead　to　a　crisis　of　separation　of　the
nation－state．　The　Coptic　Church，　on　the　other　hand，　has　been　trying　to　stabilize　the　commu－
nity，　on　occasion　by　emphasizing　its　position　as　being　a　church　inside　Egypt　in　the　Arab
world，　which　may　have　been　derived　from　the　Iesson　the　Church　learned　from　its　long　history．
　　　The　influence　of　the　New　Wafd　Party，　which　revived　recently　by　succeeding　to　the　Wafd
Party’s　political　constituency，　is　still　unknown　in　the　present　Egyptian　political　arena．　But　as
long　as　NWP　remains，　just　as　in　the　case　of　the　Wafd　Party，　to　be　the　political　consociation
limited　to　the　bourgeois　groups　of　the　Muslim　and　Coptic　communities　and　further　ignore　the
interest　of　the　masses　of　both　communities，　then　the　possibility　of　Muslim－Coptic　conflict　will
arise　again　with　the　aggravation　of　economic　conditions．
　　　Thus，　the　Coptic　community　in　this　stage　can　be　understood　essentially　within　the
framework　of　national　integration／disintegration．
b）　Economic　Environment
　　　　By　the　beginning　of　the　twentieth　century，　Egypt　shifted　from　an　exporter　of　grain　to　an
importer，　as　a　result　of　the　transformation　of　agricultural　lands　into　cotton丘elds　along　the
line　of　monoculture　policy．　It’s　economic　environment　was　therefore　typically　colonial．　On
one　hand，　famines　occurred　and　the　masses　of　both　urban　and　rural　communities　suffered
from　hunger．　On　the　other，　a　handful　big　Iandowners　accumulated　savings　and　private
property　thanks　to　their　connection　with　foreign　capitals．　According　to　the　study　by　R．　Owen，
land　area　owned　by　an　average　household　in　1882　was　4．3feddan，　but　it　was　reduced　to　2．92
by　1917．　Similarly，　according　to　the　statistics　taken　in　1913，　the　strata　of　households　owning
less　than　l　feddan　and　over　50　feddan　respectively　were　expanding，　showing　the　polarization
of　the　Egyptian　society．（47）
　　　　People　were　dissatis且ed　with　the　situation　and　their　discontent　was　combined　with
anti－British　movement　and　nationalism　At　that　point　in　history，　the　Wafd　Party　functioned
as　an　allied　political　body　of　the　Muslim　and　Coptic　bourgeoisie　and　effectively　served　as　an
organization　to　absord　the　dissatisfaction　of　the　masses　and　to　achieve　independence．
Nevertheless，　after　the　independence　in　1923，　Egypt　offered　a　favorable　market　for　the
growth　of　the　bourgeoisie　connected　with　foreign　corporations．　On　the　other　hand，　peasants
and　farmers　were　driven　to　suffer　more　seriously　from　their　reduced　econbmic　power，　which
provoked　rural　riots　frequently　beginning　in　the　early　1940s．
　　　The　revolution　in　1952　finally　realized　a　land　reform　and　controlled　economy，　and　most
major　enterprises　were　nationalized　in　the　first　half　of　the　60s　under　the　socialistic　economic
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system．　On　the　contrary，　Sadat’s　open－door　policy（　infita－ha）was　aimed　at　solving　the
problem　of　lack　of　government　funds　which　had　been　curtailed　by　the　repeated　wars　with
Israel．　Under　the　policy　he　tried　to　develop　the　private　sector　again　and　to　introduce　foreign
capital　from　Europe　and　USA．　But　the　introduction　of　foreign　capital　helped　develop　only
some　parts　of　industry　such　as　distribution　and　trade　sectors，　and　Egypt’s　financial　status　in
real　terms　is　close　to　bankrupcy　due　to　accumulated　trade　deficit　and　foreign　debts．　In　1981，
when　the　Muslim・Copt　con且ict　was　at　its　peak，　Egypt’s　foreign　debts　became＄20　billion　while
its　GNP　was　only＄28　billion．　Along　with　Mexico　and　Brazi1，　Egypt　is　in　a　critical　situation
with　the　obligation　to　repay　its　debts．
　　　Also，　under　the　i面t巨ha　policy，　the　inflation　rate　shows　as　high　as　nearly　50％，　making
the　life　of　the　people　even　harder　to　such　an　extent　as　causing　the　price　riot　in　1977．　In　the
demonstration　against　the　sharp　price　rise　held　in　January　of　the　same　year，　Sadat　and　his
wife　were　publicly　accused　by　name，　which　indicated　populatlon’s　impression　that　only
limited　strata　of　the　society　were　enj　oying　the　benefit　of　the　introduction　of　foreign　capital．
In　response　to　the　demonstration，　the　government　had　to　withdraw　the　bill　to　raise　the　prices
of　daily　commodities，　but，　at　the　same　time，　it　announced　strict　security　orders　banning
unlawful　demonstrations．　The　people’s　dissatisfaction　with　the　present　situation　is　worsening
in　the　fact　of　distressed　daily　living　caused　by　chronic　economic　crisis　and　rapid　increase　in
urban　population　which　were　brought　about　by　inflation．　Above　all，　the　situation　my　be
instrumental　for　Islam　fundamentalists　to　gain　the　support　of，　and　permeate　into　the　people
who　wish　to　see　the　status　quo　reformed．
　　　With　respect　both　to　Case　I　and　II，　the　distressed　economic　life　of　the　general　public　as
explained　above　underlied　the　process　in　which　the　Muslim　radicals　became　activated　and
popularized．　when　such　a　situation　was　combined　with　the　fluctuation　of　the　conventional
structure　of　order　which　was　caused　by　political　changes，　attacks　on　the　Copts　were　provoked
and　the　Muslim－Copt　conHicts　were　generated．
　　　　Not　to　mention，　conditions　determining　the　genesis　of　a　specific　event　have　complex　and
multi・layered　formation　and，　in　a　way　its　determining　factors　are　found　everywhere，　includ－
ing　the　super－structure，　individual　personalities　and　international　relations．　The　Muslim・Copt
con伍cts　were　no　exception．　There　were　factors　of　which　inHuence　cannot　be　disregarded，
such　as　the　charismatic　personality　of　Kyrilus　V　and　ShunOda　III，　imperialistic　colonial
domination，　the　First　World　War，　US－USSR　Cold　War，　Arab－Israeli　War　and　their　repercus・
sions　and　ramifications．　Among　others，　the　emergence　of　radical　groups　that　have　been
brought　about　by　political　change　and　ecnomic　problems　may　be　regarded　as　the　most
indispensable　condition　in　the　mechanism　of　the　emergence　of　con伍cts　between　different
COmmUnltleS．
　　c）　Religion　as　Ideology
　　　The　next　subject　to　be　examined　is　the　question　why　radicals　came　into　the　scene
everytime　political　and　economic　crises　became　acuter　in　modern　and　contemporary　Egypt．
This　type　of　question　has　been　directed　to　Islam　fundamentalism　which　forms　the　back・
ground　of　the　majority　Muslim　radicals　and　to　the　existence　of　the　minority　Coptic　radicals．
Both　Islam　fundamentalism　and　the　problem　of　Coptic　radicals　are　social　phenomena
stemming　from　the　same　root，　and　accordingly，　an　investigation　of　the　former　automatically
leads　to　that　of　the　latter．
　　　Generally　speaking，　there　have　been　two　extremes　of　view　on　lslam　fundamentalists，　one
looking　at　them　as　anti・Western　fanatic　Muslims，　and　the　other　as　representatives　of　the
Third　world　resisting　modernization　and　repulsing　western　life　style　which　is　rapidly　expand－
ing　all　over　the　world．　At　the　same　time，　the　cause　of　the　revival　of　Muslim　radicalism　has
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been　traced　back　to　the　particularity　of　Islam　as　a　religion．　A　good　example　of　such　a
viewpoint　is　found　in　the　prejudice　of　Orientalism．　Then，　in　order　to　be　free　from　the　bias　of
Orientalism，　we　need　to　confirm　the　following　two　definitions：First，　the　author　de五nes　the
religious　mass　movement　as　a　mobilizing　system　of　society．　This　means，　this　study　will
analyze　from　a　politico・sociological　standpoint　the　mechanism　of　mass　mobilization　by　Islam
fundamentalists，　its　relation　with　other　social　systems　and　its　influence　over　national　integra－
tion．　Secondly，　with　respect　to　the　definition　of　collective　identity，　the　author　will　not　look　at
the　group　indentity　as　a　permanent　and　fixed“primordial　sentiment”as　proposed　by　Clifford
Geerts．（48｝As　mentioned　earlier，　neither　the　Muslim　nor　the　Coptic　community　is　a　rnonolithic
group．　Inside　them　exist　a　number　of　differing　interest　sub－groups．　Their　identity　is　fromed
through　a　complex　and　multi4ayered　process．　And，　as　exempli丘ed　in　the　birth　of　the　Wafd
Party，　the　framework　of　group　formation　sometimes　changes　in　response　to　the　prevailing
political　and　economic　conditions．　In　other　words，　the　group　identity　is　selected　in　accordance
with　changes　in　the　external　environment，　and　it　changes　through　varying　historical　situa－
tions．　If　the　reality　of　permanent　and　primordial　identity　is　dubious，　then　the　following
question　will　arise：under　what　conditions　a　speci且c　group　identity　is　to　be　established　and
maintained．　The　question　at　stake　at　this　point　is　not　about　which　of　the　group　units－state，
nation，　class　or　religion－is　the　basic　group　founded　on　the　basis　of　primordial　human
sentiment，　but　why，　at　a　specific　time　in　history，　a　speci丘c　group　identity　is　emphasized．
　　　　Therefore，　the　term“group　identity”is　defined　here　as　an　organization　for　self－
determination　through　which　human　beings　politicize　themselves　as　collective“WE”．　The
group　is　formed　by　individuals　for　survival　and　we　may　call　it　a　community．　A　community
has　some　common　symbols　and　is　a　group　unit　within　which　marriage　takes　place．　It　is　a丘eld
of　dense　communication　network　among　individuals，　and　the　network　is　manifested　as　its
culture，　language　and　customs．　In　other　words，　the　density　of　the　communication　network
guarantees　the　validity　of　the　community　itself．　On　occasion　and　at　other　times，　the　symbol
of　the　community　may　be　concentrated　in　religion，　race　or　ethnicity．（49）In　modern　times　the
unit　of　political　group　that　gives　peoPle　the　strongest　identity　has　been　the　nation。state．
European　countries　homogenized　a　certain　degree　of　difference　within　them　and　established
the　system　of　nation－states．　And　they　took　advantage　of　their　gigantic　power　to　divide　the
world．　In　the　face　of　this，　it　became　an　imperative　task　for　ex－colonial　countries　after　World
War　II　to　build　up　a　nation　which丘ts　in　the　framework　of　nation・states．　If　so，　then　a　question
arises　as　to　why　fundamentalism，　rather　than　nation・states，　has　become　the　factor　which
motivates　group　identity　in　today’s　Third　World．
　　　During　the　period　of　World　War　II　and　through　the　1950s　and　60s，　the　whole　of　the　Third
World　was　motivated　to　realize　nationalism　and　t6　construct　nation－states　in　the　given
territories，　primarily　being　driven　by　the　idea　of　modernization　theories．　According　to　these
theories，　so－called　modernization，　namely　improvement　and　development　of　transport　and
communications　networks，　would　densely　connect　divergent　components　of　society，　reduce
intra・regional　cultural　differences，　and　promote　the　establishment　of　common　identity．
Despite　the　efforts　for　modernization　and　development　of　communications，　however，　the
Third　World　today　saw　neither　national　integration　nor　social　mobilization　being　successfully
promoted．　People　have　become　disillusioned　by　the　fact　that　modernization　made　the　eco－
nomic　gaps　among　different　groups　more　prominent　rather　than　integrating　groups　into　a
nation．（50）In　other　words，　nation・states　were　formed　in　compliance　with　the　economic　interest
of　the　political　groups　that　were　advocating　nationalism．　And　in　the　case　of　Egypt，　the
political　system　of　the　new・born　state　is　closely　connected　with　the　economic　interest　of　a
particular　group　which　is　formed　beyond　the　difference　between　Muslims　and　Copts．　Both　in
the　Muslim　and　Coptic　communities，　dissatisfaction　grew　among　those　who　were　excluded
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from　this　political　system，　and　it　is　in　this　context　that　fundamentalism　came　to　motivate
those　excluded　to　have　a　strong　group　identity．
　　　The　Muslim－Copt　conflicts　therefore　did　not　occur　as　a　religious　dispute　stemming　from
the　existence　of　monolithic　Muslim　and　Coptic　communities．　On　the　contrary，　the　conflicts
occurred　because　the　vertical　unity　within　each　community　was　weak　and　there　was　a　serious
internal　economic　gap．　And，　the　bourgeois　groups　of　both　communities　need　to　make
compromises　simply　because　they　lack　in　essential　support　of　the　masses　from　within　the
groups．（See　Figure　I＆II）
VIII．　Conclusion
　　　We　have　analyzed　the　background　of　the　Muslim－Copt　conHicts　through　the　examples　of
modern　and　contemporary　Egypt．　These　conflicts　were　by　no　means　manifestations　of
emotional　antagonism　between　people　belonging　to　different　religious　communities　where
they　are　supposedly　confirmed　in　their　primordial　identity　and　which　are　allegedly，　as
separate　fragments，　constituting　a　mosaiclike　Islamid　World．
　　　At　the　same　time，　Islam　fundamentalism　and　the　Coptic　radical　movement，　both　of　which
played　the　major　role　in　the　conflicts　examined　in　this　study，　were　political　movements　which
were　in　fact　chosen　to　pursue　under　the　prevailing　social　condition．　In　the　social　structure
where　individual　aspiration　for　self・determination　could　not　be　absorbed　in　the　existing
nation・state，　the　only　choice　left　for　such　aspiration　to　get　activated　was　to　initiate　political
movement　through　the　organized　fundamentalist　activities．　Thus　the　phenomena　of　Islam
fundamentalism　and　Coptic　radicalism　were　never　those　deriving　from　the　particularity　of
Islam　as　being　a　religion　united　with　politics，　but　should　be　interpreted　from　a　social
structural　viewpoint．　More　than　anything　else，　the　generative　process　of　the　radical　move－
ment　of　the　Copts　on　the　minority　side　shows　a　valid　proof　of　this　hypothesis．　In　addition　to
Islam　and　Coptic　fundamentalism，　the　present　Third　World　sees　more　movements　that　can
be　categorized　as　fundamentalist　such　as　those　of　Hindus，　Sikhs　and　Buddhists．　Some　say
that　the　vitality　of　these　fundamentalist　movements　is　rooted　in　the　transformation　of
religion　into　ideology．　Yet　this　interpretation　is　trapped　in　the　tautology　based　on　a　misunder・
standing　of　the　role　of　religion．　In　principle，　religion　is　an　ideology　itself　which　forms　the
value　system　and　disciplines　the　norms　of　life．　Thus，　when　an　identity　crisis　arises　as　a　result
of　social　change　which　puts　even　the　value　system　into　question，　ideology　becomes　all　the
more　appealing　to　people　as　the　degree　of　its　fundamentalist　character　increases．　And　such
ideology　initiates　the　formation　of　what　Louis　Althuseer　called　reflective　and　specular
structure，　and　then　transforms　individuals　into　subjects　which　will　come　to　comply　with　a
particular　symbolic　order　in　the　end．（51）In　the　Third　World　religions　sufficiently　fulfill　such
an　ideological　role　in　the　social　system　and　are　expected　to　complement　what　other　systems，
Political　and　economic，　have　failed　to　realize．
　　　　In　this　respect，　the　question　being　raised　in　the　religioμs　conflicts　in　modern　and　contem・
porary　Egypt　has　at　its　base　certain　problems　that　are　not　only　relevant　to　Egyptian　society
but　also　to　the　Third　World　as　a　whole．　These　problems　center　around　four　major　issues：
namely，　national　integration　being　rapidly　pursued　from　above；legitimacy　of　the　political
authority　promoting　such　national　integration；changes　in　the　social　structure　resulting　from
the　modernization　of　industrial　structure；and　distribution　of　wealth　under　the　new　market
system　which　was　brought　about　by　the　formation　of　a　nation－state．
　　　　Lastly，　however，　a　question　still　remains　as　to　whether　fundamentalist　movements，　Islam
or　Coptic，　would　be　able　to　give　an　absolute　guarantee　to　individuals　living　in　the　changing
society．　The　observations　of　these　religious　movements　reveal　that　these　movements　are　at
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the　same　time　bringing　about　disintegration，　confiicts　and　collapse　to　the　society．　If　the
political　powers　of　the　Third　World　will　try　to　form　and　maintain　their　nation・states　solely
for　their　own　interests，　and　further　if，　in　transforming　the　political－economic　system　and　the
national　market，　these　political　powers　will　neglect　both　to　extend　the　benefit　of　moderniza－
tion　to　the“people”and　to　enhance　the　mobility　among　heterogeneous　groups，　then　Islam
fundamentalism　and　other　religions　will　continue　to　be　a　motivation　for　people’s　group
identity　all　the　more　strongly　as　these　religions’fundamentalist　nature　is　strengthened．
＊　This　paper　is　a　revised　version　of　my　paper　originally　published　in　Annals　of　Japanese　Middle　Eastern
　　Studies，　No．1，1983，　in　Japanese．
　　Iwould　like　to　thank　Prof．　Zachary　Lockman　of　Harvard　Univ．　who　kindly　gave　me　advice　for　the　revision
　　in　1989．
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